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9/17/2004
An End to Ambiguity:
US Counter-Proliferation from Tel Aviv to Tehran
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Iran's Nuclear Program
In 2002 Iran announced plans to build six nuclear power stations. As a signatory of the
Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran can buy and operate centrifuges and other
equipment needed for enriching uranium as long as it only uses the devices for nuclear
power. NPT rules require that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) be allowed into Iranian labs for verification purposes. Although the IAEA indicated
on September 13, 2004 that officials were being allowed access to Iranian nuclear
facilities, aspects of Iran's uranium enrichment efforts remain unclear.
Particles of weapons grade enriched uranium were detected in Iran during IAEA inspections.
Iran claimed contamination was present on imported equipment. According to Jane's
Defence Weekly, IAEA inspectors reached a tentative conclusion that equipment smuggled
through the network headed by Pakistani scientist AQ Khan arrived in Iran contaminated
from previous enrichment. Other analysts believe the traces are damning evidence of a
clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons program.
Whether or not Iran is currently pursuing nuclear weapons, American interests are best
served if all nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is reversed. Unfortunately, recent
US policies have only created conditions in which nuclear weapon acquisition is seen as a
means of survival for countries on the neoconservative policy “target list”.
From the Iranian perspective, Israel has not only successfully developed its own arsenal
of nuclear weapons under a policy of “strategic ambiguity”, it has also shaped
US policy through American neoconservatives with ties to the Israeli Likud party. American
citizens must demand an effective counter proliferation strategy toward Tehran that first
eliminates the policy of “strategic ambiguity” operating in Tel Aviv and
Washington.
Balancing Against the Nuclear Hegemon
In the Middle East, there is only one known nuclear power. Israel has successfully
maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity”, neither admitting nor denying
possession of nuclear weapons. This has allowed Israel to skirt NPT and US trade sanctions
such as the Symington Amendment. Though estimates of the Israeli arsenal vary widely,
depending upon the source, strategic ambiguity has helped transform Israel into the
region's only nuclear power. (See Exhibit #1).
Exhibit 1: Estimates of the Israeli Nuclear Arsenal
(Source: USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air War College citations)
Year |
Estimates from Various Sources |
1967 |
13 bombs |
1969 |
5-6 bombs of 19
Kilotons yield |
1973 |
13 bombs. 20 nuclear missiles and development of a
“suitcase bomb” |
1974 |
3 nuclear capable
artillery battalions each with 12 175mm tubes and total of 108 warheads. 10 bombs |
1976 |
10-20 nuclear weapons |
1980 |
200 bombs |
1984 |
12-31 atomic bombs
31 plutonium bombs
and 10 uranium bombs |
1985 |
At least 100 nuclear
bombs |
1986 |
100-200 fission bombs
and a number of fusion bombs |
1991 |
50-60 to 200-300 |
1992 |
Greater than 200 bombs |
1994 |
64-112 bombs @ 5
kg/warhead
70-80 weapons
”A complete repertoire” (neutron bombs, nuclear mines, suitcase bombs, submarine
borne) |
1996 |
60-80 Plutonium
weapons, maybe >100 assembles, ER variants, variable yields. Possibly 200-300.
50-90 plutonium weapons, could have well over 135.
50-100 Jericho I and 30-50 Jericho II missiles. |
1997 |
Greater than 400
deliverable thermonuclear and nuclear weapons |
Unfortunately, Israel's acquisition
of an arsenal of tactical and strategic weapons and ability to directly and indirectly
create “facts on the ground” in the region is now both the model and primary
motivation for other state actors.
According Adam
Shapiro, Israel's achievements
make future regional rebalancing inevitable:
“In the same way that Israel is promoting itself as a regional
hegemon, as a regional superpower, it is getting to the point where other countries will
seek to ally against Israel.. And it should be noted that there
is no alliance in the current formulation. Egypt, Jordan, if they are aligned with anyone,
it is the United States. They are large recipients of
American aid money and American military dollars. As such, they pose no threat whatsoever
to Israel”
(November 26, 2003 IRmep Capitol Hill
forum)
However, Iran can legitimately
assume that after Iraq, it is next in line
on the Israeli (and therefore American) list of targets for military intervention. It need read no further than the US National
Security Strategy and key neoconservative policy documents. (See Exhibit #2).
Exhibit
2 Policies Developed and Implemented by Neoconservative Ideologues
(Source:
IASPS, PNAC, NSC)
Year |
Policy |
Defining Policy Document |
Neoconservative Ideologues |
1996 |
Invade Iraq |
A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing
the Realm – Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies |
Richard Perle, Douglas
Feith, David Wurmser |
2000 |
Iran as a “Threat to US Interests in the
Gulf”, Necessity for maintaining “forward bases in the Region” |
Rebuilding
America's Defenses –Project for the New American Century |
William Kristol, Robert
Kagan, John Bolton |
2002 |
Freeze “nuclear
club” membership, “preemptive attacks” against transgressors |
The National Security Strategy –
National Security Council |
Paul Wolfowitz |
The past eight
years of American actions have taught regional observers, including Iran, three significant
lessons:
1.
Opaque nuclear capability
development and ambiguity can allow a small power to suddenly and securely enter the
nuclear club;
2.
Nascent nuclear states such as North Korea can deter attack from even the United States with only limited numbers of nuclear
weapons;
3.
A little understood extension of
“Strategic Ambiguity” into the US allows Israeli lobbies and ideologues to
successfully direct US military policy in the Middle East against threats to Israeli
interests while plausibly denying it and claiming Israel's enemies are, in fact,
America's own.
From the Iranian
government's perspective, right wing Likud policies targeting Iran make achieving its
own arsenal of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons as quickly as possible an urgent
matter of survival. From an American
standpoint, the US cannot engage or
even credibly threaten Tehran with international isolation unless America first tackles
“strategic ambiguity” in Tel Aviv and Washington. Lifting
the rhetorical smoke of “strategic ambiguity” reveals the vast differences
between US and Israeli policy objectives in the region.
(See
Exhibit #3).
Exhibit 3 State Regional Policy Objectives and Challenges
(Source: IRmep 2004)
Country |
Policy
Objectives |
Impediments/Challengers |
Iran |
1.
Maintain sovereignty,
territorial contiguity.
2.
Deter, repel, or
respond to foreign aggressors. |
1.
US military presence on two fronts.
2.
Lack of tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons. |
Israel |
1.
Extend nuclear
hegemony in the region
2.
Maintain benefits of
“strategic ambiguity”
3.
Defeat perceived
rivals without appearing to do so. |
1.
Nuclear club
entrants.
2.
International
scrutiny, growing international pressure.
3.
Deteriorating
“cover” for neoconservative policy implementation by the U.S. |
United States |
1.
Secure global access
to petroleum and natural gas reserves.
2.
Continuous petroleum
and natural gas production.
3.
Elimination of WMD
and forces driving proliferation in the region. |
1.
Widespread conflict
driven by religious extremism.
2.
Terror attacks
against energy production infrastructure
3.
Inability to
negotiate, form international coalitions or be perceived as an “honest broker”
in the region. |
America's first step
toward diffusing regional proliferation is dispersing the fog of “strategic
ambiguity.” If Israeli nuclear weapons
and regional policies are the major catalyst of demand for weapons of mass destruction by
other regional actors, Israel's operatives
in the United States are clearly the
fixative. Recent allegations about sensitive,
classified documents on US policy toward Iran making their way from Undersecretary of
Defense Douglas Feith's office to AIPAC, and
then on to Israel are only the most recent incident causing Americans to lose confidence
that Israeli-linked officials are compromising American interests. To date, Perle, Feith, and Wolfowitz, among other
neoconservatives, have operated under an inky cloud of “strategic ambiguity”
from which they claim efforts on behalf of Israel are in fact truly for America.
It is now time for America to “clean house” of the entire lot of compromised
neoconservative advisors in order to assure both the American people and international
community that US actions in the region are a legitimate reflection of true American
interests, rather extensions of Israeli policy. America can no longer
function or exert influence in the region unless it regains status as an “honest
broker”. Future policy in the
region, including potential military actions, will suffer growing skepticism from American
citizens now becoming aware of the curious and unpalatable linkages key administration
advisors have to Israel.
Recommendations: Defusing a Nuclear Middle
East
America's principle
interest is to defuse all Middle East nuclear
proliferation. Even the most limited use of
tactical or nuclear weapons in the petroleum rich Middle East by any party
could throw the world into an unending economic depression.
To avert nascent nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the US must:
Demand a Public Nuclear Audit from
Tel Aviv Unless Congress drops decades of complicity obscuring Israeli nuclear
arms policy, it will never understand or constructively deal with the prime motivation for
other regional states to acquire nuclear weapons. Congress must immediately recognize that
Israel is a nuclear power and pressure it to join the NPT. An immediate IAEA audit
of Israeli weapons and targeting data must commence.
Regional Disarmament Treaty
US interests are best served by a fully denuclearized Middle East. Neither perceived
friends nor enemies should be allowed to maintain or further develop nuclear weapons.
Toward this end, the US should apply pressure on Israel to dismantle its nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction under multinational observation. Other states can be
legitimately pressured or forced to halt development programs if a verifiable regional
treaty that also oversees the removal of Israel's arsenal is in effect.
Regional Policies must be “Made
in the USA” US advisors and policy makers lose credibility and effectiveness
if they are perceived to function under Israeli influence. The administration should
strive to purge “ambiguous” advisors and install competent appointees that can
credibly represent U.S. interests under the following criteria:
Appointees have not entered contractual,
advisory, or other business relationships with governments of the region;
Appointees have no compromising regional
ideological or religious affiliations which cloud or influence their decision making;
Appointees are competent, regionally
knowledgeable and experienced in dealing with governments across the entire Middle East.
This may require that the administration pass
over braying legions of think tank pundits and lobbyists to once again reach for proven
figures in business and academic circles. By returning to the traditional American custom
of hiring advisors and appointees who agree to serve at some sacrifice to other interests,
America can again harness the energy of motivated and uncompromised patriots.
Improving the quality of American advisors and appointees is critical for
confronting the true proliferation dynamics of the region. Ending “strategic
ambiguity” and returning to the pursuit of American regional interests is the first
step.
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