|
Category ($ Billion) |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
HS 7102
Nonindustrial Diamonds |
9.3 |
8.3 |
7.1 |
7.1 |
7.6 |
Total exports to
U.S. |
23.0 |
24.5 |
22.2 |
22.0 |
21.8 |
Diamonds as a % of
Israeli Exports to the U.S. |
40% |
34% |
32% |
32% |
35% |
Source: Query of the U.S. Department of Commerce
USA Trade Online
database, not inflation-adjusted.
Non-industrial diamonds, which Israel
sources from Africa as raw diamonds, to then cut, polish and
sell in jewelry stores across America, represented 35% of
Israel’s total $21.8 billion in goods exports to the U.S. in
2018. Over the past five years diamonds have averaged 35%
of total exports and have long been Israel’s number one U.S.
export category.
However, diamond exports from the U.S.
to Israel are also a major export category. In 2018 diamonds
represented 34% of $13.7 billion in U.S. exports to Israel.
How can this be? The U.S. has
only
one active diamond mine and its production almost never
leaves the U.S. So why do trade statistics report U.S.
diamond exports to Israel averaging $5 billion per year?
Israeli diamonds flow into the U.S.
tariff-free as merchandise intended to meet consumer market
demand. Sometimes that demand
never materializes, and the diamonds are shipped back to
Israel to be inventoried, re-mounted, or recut and exported
again to the U.S. and other markets. The trans-Atlantic
return of these diamonds produces nothing of value in terms
of net sales for the U.S. or Israel. But moving the diamonds
back to Israel does produce something else of value to
Israel—the appearance of U.S. access to the Israeli market
and the illusion of a meaningful flow of “U.S. exports” to
Israel. The U.S. Trade Representative frequently trumpets
such exports as a victory, claiming “since 1985, when the
United-States Israel FTA came into force, U.S. exports to
Israel have risen by
456 percent.”
U.S. diamond re-exports to Israel vs. total U.S. exports to
Israel
Category ($ Billion) |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
Re-exported diamonds
counted within NAICs category “339910 Jewelry &
Silverware” |
6.6 |
4.8 |
4.5 |
4.7 |
4.7 |
Total U.S. exports
to Israel |
15.1 |
13.5 |
13.2 |
12.6 |
13.7 |
Re-exported Israeli
diamonds as a % of U.S. exports to Israel |
44% |
36% |
34% |
37% |
34% |
Source: Query of the U.S. Department of Commerce
USA Trade Online
database, not inflation-adjusted.
Unfortunately for U.S. exporters, this claim of vast,
economy-boosting U.S. exports to Israel is just an
accounting game. While Israel’s diamond exports to the U.S.
are very real and always stand to produce a net benefit to
Israel, a large percentage of what is counted and reported
as U.S. goods exports to Israel is simply an accounting
trick.
The Trump administration and trade with Israel
The Trump administration has been more
beholden to Israel and its lobby’s policy demands than any
presidency in recent history. The administration has defied
established international consensus by recognizing Jerusalem
as Israel’s capital, turning a blind eye to endemic Israeli
human rights violations, overturning aid to Palestinian
refugees and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over Syria’s
Golan Heights. Despite reflexively adopting the Israeli
position in almost any given policy debate, even the Trump
administration appears to have had serious misgivings about
ILFTA.
This disagreement is rooted in the
administration’s overall beliefs about the true cause of
trade deficits. President Trump clarified his
administration’s trade policy on September 25, 2018 at the
UN General Assembly claiming the $800 billion annual U.S.
trade deficit was a result of non-reciprocal market access
and “broken
and bad trade deals.” Trump then vowed to
“systematically renegotiate” these bad trade deals. This
renegotiation initially included Israel.
According to a
2018 report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
Foreign Agricultural Service, under the 1985 Israel
deal, “virtually any product produced in Israel that can be
competitive in the U.S. market can enter the U.S.
duty-free…In contrast, U.S. products continue to face high
tariffs in many sectors limiting their access to the Israeli
market.”
Despite Trump administration moves to
boost U.S. agricultural exports to Israel, exporters should
expect little in the way of meaningful change driven by the
administration. With Benjamin Netanyahu seeking to regain
his position as prime minister in September following a
failed earlier bid during parliamentary elections, the Trump
administration is unlikely to engage in even symbolic
pressure over trade issues. Israel has successfully resisted
such U.S. pressure before. From 2005-2008 Israel appeared on
a U.S. Trade Representative watchlist for pharmaceutical
industry intellectual property violations over
copycat drug exports to the U.S. The Bush administration
did little else about it.
In the broadest sense, the U.S. has
entered into a trade pact under which it fully opens its
vast market to a partner that is committed to a mercantilist
strategy of export promotion and closed domestic markets.
U.S. exporters daring to consider Israel’s miniscule market
see this firsthand when they apply to the Israeli government
for permission to export via an
online form. They must first swear their products
are not already present in Israel, before patiently waiting
out
an opaque decision from Israel about whether they will be
allowed to trade.
Will ILFTA be overshadowed by even more harmful
Israeli initiatives?
The U.S. bilateral trade deficit with
Israel is the largest of any bilateral FTA. This is the
result of the particular circumstances that led to its
creation and maintenance. ILFTA exists not to benefit the
U.S. economy but rather Israel’s due to the intense,
oftentimes highly secretive, and sometimes outright illegal
actions of Israel and its lobby in the United States. The
Israel FTA is not important because of the overall impact it
has on trade, which is relatively insignificant. Rather, the
US Israel FTA’s results are an indicator of the harmful
overall role Israel and its lobby have on U.S. policymaking.
2018 and cumulative U.S. trade surplus (or deficit) under
all FTAs ($ billion)
Source: U.S. Census Foreign Trade Data, Cumulative Trade
Surplus (or Deficit) – $ billion, compiled and inflation
adjusted by IRmep.
The Kennedy administration and Senate
Foreign Relations Committee understood the threat in the
early 1960s. Their regulatory efforts culminated in the
November 21,
1962 Department of Justice order that the American
Zionist Committee umbrella, of which AIPAC was an integral
member, begin to register as the foreign agent of Israel.
The effort faltered and then failed in
the years following JFK’s assassination. Ever since, the
U.S. has been forced to assume an ever greater role as
Israel’s sole relevant benefactor for diplomatic, military,
moral and economic support. Unfortunately for most
Americans, ongoing fallout from the FTA may not be the most
damaging initiative launched by Israel and its lobby.
Considering the little known past as prologue, what other
“bad deals” beyond trade are looming? IRmep forecasts the
following probabilities, most of which could vastly exceed
the harmful fallout of the FTA.
1.
100% probability the U.S. trade deficit with
Israel will continue to grow. Under immense ongoing
pressure from Israel, Israel lobby campaign contributors.
and lobbying the U.S. will be unable to pursue the interests
of U.S. exporters and the bilateral trade deficit with
Israel will continue ballooning to new heights. If the deal
is renegotiated, it will be done in a way that again
prioritizes Israeli interests over those of the U.S.
2.
100% probability Congress will greatly exceed MOU
caps on U.S. military transfers to Israel. Congress has
been chafing under military aid restrictions in the
Memorandum of Understanding with Israel and will freely
exceed aid ceilings and ignore requirements that Israel
return U.S. military aid in excess of caps.
3.
70% probability that larger numbers of Israeli
companies entwine with U.S. companies via state
partnerships. Israel will continue its drive to
economically entwine Israeli corporations with U.S.
corporations via under-the-radar initiatives within state
governments via secretive vehicles such as the
Virginia Israel Advisory Board.
4.
50% probability the U.S. attacks Iran in fulfillment
of a long-term Israeli demand. Israel lobby pressure for
the U.S. to attack Iran is immense and long preceded and
overshadowed similar Arab Gulf state demands. Such an
unnecessary U.S. war with Iran, using the costs of the
unnecessary war with Iraq as a benchmark, could cost the
U.S. tens of thousands of casualties, millions of combatant
and noncombatant casualties in the region, and cost far in
excess of $4 trillion while possibly touching off a global
economic depression.
Sources used in this report that were first made public by
IRmep
International Trade Commission report
“Probable Economic Effect of Providing Duty-Free Treatment
for Imports from Israel” unlawfully obtained by AIPAC and
the Israeli government in 1984. Obtained by IRmep over ITC
objections via a direct appeal to the Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel in 2011.
https://www.israellobby.org/ustr/
FBI counter-espionage and theft of
government property investigation targeting the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Israeli
embassy. Obtained by IRmep via the Freedom of Information
Act after FBI declassification in 2009.
https://www.israellobby.org/economy/
Documents submitted by U.S. industry
and labor groups in opposition to ILFTA obtained by IRmep
from the International Trade Commission via the Freedom of
Information Act in 2008.
https://www.israellobby.org/FTA/
2019-2028 U.S. Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) to provide Israel with $38 billion in
military aid over a ten year period. First obtained by IRmep
from the U.S. Department of State under the Freedom of
Information Act in 2016
https://www.israellobby.org/MOU/
1962-1967 U.S. Department of Justice
files on the effort to register AZC/AIPAC as an Israeli
foreign agent. Obtained by IRmep under the Freedom of
Information Act in 2008.
https://www.israellobby.org/azcdoj/
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
investigation into the
Activities of
Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the
United States report
working papers
obtained by IRmep in 2010.
Virginia Office of the Governor documents about the Virginia Israel Advisory Board obtained through the Virginia Freedom of Information Act in 2018.
About the Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy,
Inc.
The Institute for Research Middle
Eastern Policy (IRmep)
is a Washington-based nonprofit organization that studies
U.S.-Middle East policy formulation.
Founded in 2002, IRmep became an
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exposes the history and little known initiatives of Israel
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